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Risk assessment is frequently seen as technical or scientific, which it
is, at least in part. One cannot, however, treat it in only this way,
because it is permeated with normative presuppositions. Recognizing
the normative aspects of risk assessment greatly affects how we use it
and what we should expect from it, but, importantly, it also opens up
possibilities that might not be foreseen or understood if we merely treat
it as a part of core scientific disciplines. Here, I focus on aspects of
carcinogen risk assessment, 1 identify some of its main normative
presuppositions and then suggest some inferences from these points.
I
First, the very idea of a risk assessment is normatively laden. A risk
is the probability of an undesirable outcome (when probabilities can be
assigned). 2 Thus, a risk is the probability of an outcome that will be
unfortunate or undesirable from some evaluative point of view. This
first conceptual point is relatively unimportant, except as I note later,
the object of value and its importance may influence how one does the
risk assessment and treats some of the uncertainties involved. If the
valued object threatened by the risk is sufficiently important vis-a-vis
* This paper was supported in part by a National Science Foundation Grant (SBR-
93107995), An Evaluation of the Desirability of Evidentiary Procedures for
Identifying Carcinogens.
** Dr. Cranor is Professor of Philosophy and Associate Dean, College of
Humanities and Social Sciences, University of California, Riverside. He holds a B.A.
(Mathematics), University of Colorado; Ph. D. (Philosophy), University of California,
Los Angeles and M.S.L. (Law), Yale Law School. Email: carl@chss.ucr.edu.
1 1 focus on carcinogen risk assessment because more tends to be known, and risk
assessment has been more highly developed. This focus should not be taken, however,
to indicate that carcinogens are the only concern.
2 Nicholas Rescher, Risk. A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk
Evaluation and Management 5 (1983) (when probabilities cannot be assigned to each
aspect of the assessment, one has a risk and uncertainty assessment).
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the evidentiary values implicit in the risk assessment, it may effect the
conceptions and design of the evidentiary procedures.
Second, even at its best risk assessment is imperfect; mistakes will
result. The ideal is a harm assessment in which we would assess the
actual harms that would result from using carcinogens in our products
or having them as byproducts of our activities. The second best case is a
risk assessment which aims to estimate the probabilities of unfortunate
or undesirable outcomes from using carcinogens. Since probabilities are
involved, the estimates may not be correct. Furthermore, in the present
state of knowledge because carcinogen risk assessment is permeated
with a number of uncertainties, the third best case is a probability and
uncertainty assessment; this further increases the possibility of mistakes.
Two kinds of mistakes might result: false negatives, wrongly
exonerating a toxic substance as non-toxic, and false positives, wrongly
condemning a non-toxic substance as toxic. With perfect knowledge
there may be correct answers in the real world, but the chosen
procedures do not guarantee these outcomes. These possibilities are
illustrated in the following table.
No association No association
between exposure between exposure
and disease and disease
Procedure shows no
association between No mistake False negative - 3
exposure and disease
Procedure shows an
association between False positive - a No mistake
exposure and disease
While it is desirable to have procedures which result in no mistakes
no false positives and no false negatives (NFN=O; NFP=O, where NFN
is the number of false negatives and NFP, false positives) - it is rare to
have perfect procedures, and risk assessment is far from perfect.
Absent perfect procedures, the alternative is to use processes that
minimize resulting mistakes. This might be roughly represented as:
min(NFN,NFp). However, there is a problem with this characterization.
One cannot minimize two variables at once. The problem is even worse
when, as sometimes occurs in risk assessment, the two mistake variables
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are mathematically interdependent (see point four below). Moreover,
and more importantly, it is not the total number of mistakes that is
critical, but different kinds of mistakes have different consequences and
importance depending upon the context. For example, in screening for
breast cancer or AIDS, false positives are arguably of lesser concern than
false negatives; positive outcomes can be followed up with more
sensitive tests, while false negatives will wrongly give a false sense of
security which could result in patient deaths. In other circumstances,
false positives may be more important. In the non-scientific area of the
criminal law, it is much more important to avoid wrongly convicting an
innocent person (a legal false positive) than it is to avoid wrongly
exonerating a guilty person (a legal false negative).
The aim, then, for a procedure which is imperfect, should be to
reduce the total costs of mistakes, i.e., reduce mistakes that are more
important from some evaluative point of view. Symbolically, this
suggests that the aim should be to minimize the sum of the social costs
of mistakes: min[(NFN x SCFN) + (NFP x SCFp)] where SCFN is the
social cost of a false negative and SCFP is the social cost of a false
positive. The term "social costs" includes not only money, but also
other matters that might be important to us (e.g. suffering, loss of life,
being deprived of products or opportunities). This representation
suggests that the aim of a procedure should be to minimize the total
costs of all mistakes taking into account the number and importance of
each kind of mistake. Thus, this might include designing a risk
assessment process in one case which had few false positives and more
false negatives and in another case one which had few false negatives,
and more false positives, since sometimes it is more important to avoid
one kind of mistake and sometimes more important to avoid another.
There is a further normative point which should be recognized and
incorporated into the symbolic representation above. While it might be
desirable to have an assessment procedure that minimizes the total costs
of mistakes, the social, monetary and human costs of trying to
implement such a procedure could also be high or low. Thus, in
designing procedures, the costs of the procedure itself should be part of
costs to be minimized. Symbolically, this would be represented as
min[(NFN x CFN) + (NFP x CFP) + SCTI, where SCT is the social cost
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of testing or the cost of using a procedure to reduce some of the
mistakes. The point here is that if a particular procedure becomes too
costly, either itself or for the value of its information, even though it
better reduces the costs of false positives or false negatives than some
other procedures, it may have to be modified or abandoned. For
example, in the criminal law we can reduce the number of innocent
persons who are convicted by making both search and seizure rules
more strict and by making the proof requirements more demanding.
Both actions would decrease the number of innocent people who are
punished, but there are substantial social costs of doing so. Conversely,
we could reduce the number of guilty persons who go free by making
search, seizure and trial rules very favorable to the prosecution, but
again at substantial social costs. Similarly, carcinogen risk assessment
procedures could be designed dramatically to reduce either false
positives or false negatives, but the costs of the two different alternatives
should be evaluated. Thus, in designing such procedures these
normative considerations together with the numbers of the different
kinds of mistakes that are possible should be taken into account.
The above points suggest a third important consideration: Since risk
assessments are not perfect evidentiary procedures and the resulting aim
should be to reduce total social costs, such procedures are importantly
normative because of the social costs of different kinds of mistakes.
The normative portion of the symbolic representation is an on balance
judgment of the importance of avoiding one kind of mistake or the
other together with normative pros and cons of the procedures used to
reduce different mistakes. Thus, such procedures should be designed or
used by practitioners with these normative considerations in mind.3
A fourth major point about normative considerations is that
attempting to reduce one kind of mistake will often increase other
kinds of mistakes. One can show, for statistical studies using relatively
small sample sizes and attempting to detect a relatively subtle effect,
that one mathematically cannot keep the number of false positives and
false negatives both low.4 One cannot reduce both false negatives and
3 Who should make these decisions and how they should be made in a democratic
society are important topics that cannot be addressed here.
4 S. D. Walter, Determination of Significant Relative Risks and Optimal
Sampling Procedures in Prospective andRetrospective Comparative Studies of
Various Sizes, 105 Am. J. Epidemiology 387 (1977) and Carl F. Cranor, Some
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false positives simultaneously without greatly enlarging the sample size.
When such conflicts occur, one must decide the proper balance between
one mistake or another. This should be explicitly faced; it is easy to
miss in studies where strong conventions about minimizing false
positives are presumed or serve as default assumptions. Moreover,
decisions about sample sizes, cost and study feasibility also raise
normative issues. The specificity and sensitivity of studies can always be
improved by increasing sample sizes, but this increases costs and may
decrease feasibility. Thus, in the very conception and design of a stu,
critical tradeoffs may be made between cost and accuracy.
A fifth, related point is that practices and conventions within a field
can inadvertently predispose procedures to certain outcomes. In studies
to the extent that typical conventions aim to prevent false positives,
other things being equal, they increase false negatives. Also, practices,
temptations almost, that are part of scientific disciplines may incline
scientists to approach such problems as they approach bench science.
This may frustrate other goals, i.e., identifying risks to people or the
environment. While such practices might initially appear to be the
proper application of scientific methods, their application in particular
contexts may frustrate aims that risk assessment is designed to serve. As
indicated below, the temptation to do a detailed toxicity analysis of
every chemical, case-by-case in a science-intensive way, while serving
some aspects of scientific accuracy, may frustrate the timely
identification, analysis and regulation of substances that pose risks. In
epidemiology as some researchers have noted "One can always invoke
unmeasured confounders to explain away observational associations.
Thus, actions should not depend on the absence of such explanations,
for otherwise action would never be taken." 5
Finally, other normative considerations creep into carcinogen risk
assessment because of the uncertainties which currently pervade it, but I
will not develop those in great detail here since they are somewhat more
peripheral to this discussion. 6
Moral Issues in Risk Assessment, 101 Ethics 123 (1990).
5 Sander Greenland, Invited Commentary: Science versus Public Health Action:
Those Who Were Wrong Are Still Wrong, 133 Am. J. Pub. Health 435 (1991).
6 Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the
Law 25-28 (1993) (For example, risk assessments are substantially influenced by
normative judgments in choices of models, and the cumulative efforts of many typical
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II
What can we infer from the normative presuppositions in risk
assessment? First, because of pervasive uncertainties in risk assessment, it
differs from core areas of science. There are many more uncertainties in
risk assessment than in more settled scientific areas. Of course, cutting-
edge science has many uncertainties, but because of the contentious
nature of many risk assessment issues, the significance of the
uncertainties will probably be magnified. Second, because of the
response to uncertainties and other considerations noted above, risk
assessment is substantially permeated with normative judgments.
Third, as developed in some detail elsewhere, it is difficult or
impossible to separate risk assessment from risk management. 7 For
one thing, as noted above, where statistical studies are needed to
provide evidence of toxicity, decisions about sample size, cost of
experiment, and the desired degree of accuracy all involve normative
decisions in the very conception and design of such studies. Moreover,
since risk assessment is an imperfect procedure, there will be mistakes
and which mistakes the process is designed to avoid is an important
normative issue. One must make a policy decision (or decisions) about
the degree of accuracy sought, the social costs of achieving that
accuracy and the importance of the risks to be prevented. Explicit
discussion of alternatives to conventional risk assessment and risk
management practices of scientists should occur because many current
practices may frustrate preventive goals.
Fourth, as just noted, there is often a logical incompatibility
between low false positives and low false negatives; in other cases there
are scientific practices that may frustrate the discovery of risks. In such
circumstances, scientists need to be wary of their rigorous commitment
to low false positives or to certain practices precisely because these can
inadvertently prevent the discovery of the risks in question.
Fifth, a larger point is that evidentiary values implicit in scientific
inquiry (low false positives, a scientific notion of accuracy, a particular
conception of rigor and a desire not to add mistakenly to the stock of
scientific practices may greatly slow risk assessments).
7 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government:
Managing the Process 76 (1983); Donald G. Barnes, Times Are Tough: Brother Can
You Paradigm, 14 Risk Anal. 219 (1994) and Cranor, supra note 3.
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scientific knowledge) may inadvertently trump the values the risk
assessment serves. The enumerated scientific practices may
inadvertently elevate the virtues of a scientific procedure above the
normative concerns that motivate assessments, can inadvertently
influence outcomes and possibly prevent or delay discovery of the very
harm for which the assessment was undertaken. Very persuasive reasons
would have to be provided for research scientific evidentiary goals
always to trump such social goals. For example, an insistence on very
low false positive rates may prevent the discovery of existing risks for
which the study was done. By contrast, an approach to risk assessment
more sensitive to the context would avoid insensitive reliance on low
false positive rates, practices which would frustrate the discovery of the
risks in question, a misplaced sense of rigor, and a misguided notion of
accuracy. In some circumstances where statistical studies are the
primary evidence this might mean tolerating somewhat higher false
positives rates so that false negative rates could be lower.
Sixth, if the aim of risk assessments should be to reduce the total
social costs of mistakes together with the social costs of the procedures
for doing the risk assessment, there is no guarantee that scrupulous
scientific accuracy will minimize the social costs of the procedure. An
abstract point is that scientific accuracy is only one of several variables
that would help minimize mistakes and there is no assurance that
vigorously pursuing it will result in the lowest total cost of mistakes and
the procedure as a whole. A secondary reason is that the scientific
paradigm tends to focus on avoiding false positives and on having a
great deal of confidence in one's positive results. But as already noted
this commitment may actually frustrate some of the public health goals
of the risk assessment process itself. For example, economists have
noted that one of the more scientifically rigorous procedures for
identifying carcinogens, the use of the animal bioassay, is rarely worth
the cost for the evidentiary information it provides. 8 Depending
upon the social costs at stake, a less rigorous adherence to scientific
evidentiary standards may better reduce the total social costs of
mistakes.
8 Lester B. Lave et al., The Information Value of the Animal Bioassay, 336 Nature
631 (1988).
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Recognizing that the aim of risk assessment should be to reduce the
total social costs of two kinds of mistakes plus the costs of the
procedures releases us from a particular rigidly scientific paradigm.
Freeing us from that then opens up opportunities to develop different
procedures and models for assessing the risk from toxic substances. (I
return to this below.) Further, the costs of the procedures themselves
can be substantial. In fact, I believe a scientific-intensive paradigm
which focuses on the case-by-case evaluation of the toxic properties of
each substance with the further aim of understanding the mechanisms
by which the toxic properties operate (a quite appropriate procedure for
doing good science and good toxicology) can be costly in terms of
money, time and human resources. Thus, the aim of reducing the total
social costs of doing risk assessments invites us to reevaluate existing
procedures. If we can achieve much the same aims with an overall
reduction of money, time and other costs, this revised picture of risk
assessment would recommend that we adopt the less socially costly
procedures. This suggests that one needs the idea of the minimum kind
and amount of evidence to judge the toxicity of substances to serve
relevant social goals. Thus, for example, for warning people that
substances might be toxic, so that they can take protective steps, one
might need a less substantial evidentiary base than for setting ambient
concentrations of a substance that would reduce risks to some socially
acceptable level. The evidentiary basis needed for technology forcing
statutes might lie between these extremes.
There can be social costs from slow risk assessments when regulators
are working under either post-market or premarket regulatory statutes.
Post-market statutes leave people exposed to toxic substances in
commerce until their toxicity is discovered and they are regulated. The
costs from slow procedures are the monetary and social costs of the
procedures themselves and opportunity costs resulting from the slow
rate of assessment which may leave unevaluated other toxic substances
in commerce to inflict injuries. Inaction is costly, thus, the rate of the
identification and assessment of carcinogens is an important normative
consideration. Similarly, even under premarket statutes there can be
costs to the rate of evaluation. Under a premarket statute, a substance
proposed for introduction into commerce is not harming anyone, if it
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turns out to be toxic, until there is actual exposure, so the slowness of a
premarket procedure does not pose the same problems as in the post-
market case. However, if, in an extreme case, a substance will bring life-
saving benefits, slow evaluation of its toxicity may result in serious
health consequences from inaction. For example, if certain AIDS drugs
would in fact save lives; slow premarket procedures might substantially
harm AIDS victims. In such cases, it seems appropriate to have
expedited reviews and possibly a different evidentiary base. However,
there is a cautionary note. In the past, different parties have complained
that both postmarket and premarket procedures have been too slow.
Sometimes parties to the debates have argued in effect for keeping
postmarket procedures science-intensive, thus slow, while expediting
premarket procedures. However, these have tended to be self-interested
arguments. A more principled view would be to design both sets of
procedures so that they better serve the aims of reducing the total social
costs of identifying and assessing toxic substances and protecting the
public health.
To illustrate the consequences of reducing total social costs,
consider alternative procedures to existing carcinogen potency and
identification procedures. Current carcinogen potency assessments are
typically slow, taking from 0.5-5 person years per substance. 9 While
these are as accurate as they can be at present (insofar as this can be
determined), they are expensive, 10 have substantial opportunity costs,
and do not address well public health costs posed by the whole universe
of known carcinogenic substances11 or the whole universe of chemical
substances. There are 72,000 substances in EPA's inventory of chemicals
under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 12 most of which are
9 Information presented to California's Proposition 65 Science Advisory panel on
which the author served.
10 Science-intensive carcinogen potency assessments for 200 substances would cost
from $7-70M whereas one expedited procedure evaluated in California costs about
$4,000 and another $40,000 (Information presented to California's Proposition 65
Science Advisory Panel). Also, science-intensive assessments require the expertise of
one or more highly-trained toxicologists, whereas the two expedited procedures
necessitate much less reliance on expensive experts.
11 California Environmental Protection Agency, Procedure for Prioritizing
Candidate Chemicals for Consideration Under Proposition 65 by the "State's
Qualified Experts" (over 500 identified by the State of California).
12 U. S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Toxic Substances Control Act:
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unevaluated. 13 But risk assessments can be done differently. We could
use faster procedures that might be slightly less "accurate" but would
decrease the number of known but unassessed carcinogens. This would
result in lower overall social and agency costs. In fact there are technical
assessment procedures, scientific approximations really, which are quite
accurate and relatively quick that can be used for many regulatory
purposes. These results are described elsewhere 14 and have been
adopted into regulation in California. Such procedures permitted the
potency assessment of 200 substances in less than one year by the
California Environmental Protection Agency and added more than 140
substances to the list under California's Proposition 65. These are not
the only expedited procedures that have been considered for public
health protection. In 1989, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration proposed to use American Council of Industrial
Hygienists standards to set exposure standards for 428 air toxics to
greatly expedite its regulatory agenda' 5 and other researchers have
proposed somewhat different expedited regulatory procedures. 16
Similar procedures could perhaps be adopted for the identification
of carcinogens. Currently, carcinogens are identified for regulation
either by means of human epidemiological studies or animal bioassays.
Both are costly and time-consuming, but given human health concerns,
animal bioassays are the preferred procedure, since it seems wrong to
wait for a sufficient number of human deaths to be detected by
epidemiological studies before taking precautionary action. However,
even animal studies are slow, taking from five to seven years to
complete, and costly (about $2M per study). While such studies are
being conducted and analyzed other substances are being ignored -
there are not enough toxicologists to assess all suspect substances in this
Legislative Changes Could make the Act More Effective 2 (1994).
13 The Environmental Protection Agency has evaluated only 2% of 62,000
chemicals in commerce when the agency began to assess new substances under the
Toxic Substances Control Act. Id. at 3.
14 Sara Hoover et al., Improving the Regulation of Carcinogens by Expediting
Cancer Potency Assessments, 15 RiskAnal. 267 (1995); Carl F. Cranor, The Social
Benefits of Expedited Risk Assessment, 15 Risk Anal. 353 (1995).
15 See Air Contaminants Standard Overturned, Occupational Health and Safety
Newsletter, July 8, 1992, at 103.
16 David W. Gaylor & Lois S. Gold, Quick Estimate of the Regulatory Virtually
Safe Dose Based on the Maximum Tolerated Dose for Rodent Bioassay, Reg.
Toxicol. & Pharmacol. (1995).
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kind of detail. Thus, like potency assessments, at present the
identification of carcinogens is slow, is resource-intensive and appears to
have substantial opportunity costs.
The paradigm shift suggested above, thus opens opportunities for
identification procedures. If there are expedited methods that keep
false negatives quite low (the more important concern from a public
health perspective it appears), keep false positives within a reasonable
range and lower identification costs, we should prefer them to current
procedures because of lower total social costs and how well they serve
overall public health and other values. Some such procedures have been
identified, 17 and other preliminary work suggests the following.
There are various short-term tests (STTs), e.g., of mutagenicity,
structure-activity relationships, etc., that are quick, inexpensive, and
relatively easy to use compared with animal carcinogenic bioassays.
Their use could provide an approximate characterization of the risks
posed by substances and result in public health benefits (because toxic
substances would be identified earlier). A recent workshop evaluated
the accuracy of approximately fifteen different expedited procedures
for their accuracy against the results of animal bioassays. 18 Validating
them faced some difficulties, but nevertheless several procedures appear
to be sufficiently accurate to use for identification purposes. In
addition, modeling procedures similar to those used by environmental
economists, 19 suggests that even STTs that are less than fully accurate,
with false negative and false positive rates above .05, may have uses both
in premarket and in postmarket regulation, depending upon some facts
about the world and what is at stake. For example, if the percentage of
carcinogens in the chemical universe is 7.5% or greater, then STTs
appear to be justified compared with reliance upon the results of animal
bioassays for providing preliminary identification of carcinogens. Such
17 Lester Lave & Gilbert S. Omenn, Cost-Effectiveness of Short-Term Tests for
Carcinogencity, 324 Nature 29 (1986).
18 Science and Policy Issues in the Application of Alternative Carcinogen
Identification Methods (1995) (funded by NSF Grant SBR-93107995).
19 See, e.g., Lave & Omenn, supra note 17; Talbot Page, A Framework of
Unreasonable Risk in the Toxic Substances Control Act, in Annals of the New York
Academy of Science: Management of Assessed Risk for Carcinogens, 145 (W. J.
Nicholson, ed. 1981). Also the author used a similar modeling method in The Social
Benefits of Expedited Risk Assessment, 15 Risk Anal. 353 (1995).
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procedures will result in mistakes, both false positives and false
negatives, but the balance of the social costs of such mistakes favors
using faster, even if somewhat less accurate identification procedures,
rather than slow science-intensive methods. The greater the percentage
of carcinogens, the better the case for utilizing STTs.20
Lists of substances identified as carcinogens by expedited
procedures might have uses both outside and inside regulatory
processes. Outside the regulatory environment lists of likely carcinogens
based upon STTs could be used by academics in their research to begin
to fill data gaps, provide clues to the toxicity of substances for further
investigation, or help confirm or refute preliminary toxicity
implications. Such tests and lists could also be used by private industry
for its own internal considerations (as they almost surely are) or by the
public for self-protection, a kind of informal analog to California's
Proposition 65. In a regulatory context, in addition to the above uses,
such lists could by used by governmental agencies to trigger testing
requirements under the Toxic Substances Control Act, used in
conjunction with listing statutes such as California's Proposition 65,
Superfund Toxic Release Inventories, or other such lists which have
some legal consequences, but which do not require extensive
expenditures for money for reducing exposures to the public. They
could also be used to provide information for pollution-reduction, and
perhaps used in conjunction with technology-forcing statutes to
identify likely carcinogens and then to require industry to use
technology to reduce exposures to them. There might even be some
uses in very limited circumstances with statutes requiring the regulation
of ambient exposure levels of particular substances although such uses of
expedited procedures would be the most controversial.
Each different use would likely require different levels of
evidentiary support, but that is point. Conceiving of risk assessment as
partly normative, a policy tool, opens up the possibility of different
evidentiary approaches for different informal and regulatory purposes
- just as we otherwise demand different kinds and amounts of
evidence in different social and legal contexts.
20 Carl F. Cranor, An Evaluation of the Desirability of Evidentiary Procedures for
Identifying Carcinogens (1996) (interim and final reports to NSF).
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Eighth, the presence of normative considerations are an asset, not a
liability, in risk assessment. Recognizing the normative aspects not only
frees us from certain conceptions of the field, but it also can be used to
aid in decision making and in reconceiving the procedures. Elsewhere, I
have suggested how normative considerations can be used as they are in
the law to predispose risk assessments to decision outcomes based on
the best readily accessible scientific information and policy goals in the
face of pervasive uncertainty and in the absence of better
information.2 1 If we conceive of risk assessment procedures somewhat
less like a strictly scientific activity and somewhat more like those of
other institutions, such as the law, normative considerations are both
more appropriate and have greater pride of place, instead of being
treated like crazy, unwanted distant relatives.
Finally, the above discussion suggests a further point about the
virtues of those charged with identifying, assessing and regulating toxic
substances. Typically risk assessors are trained in scientific programs,
many in toxicology, and are apt to recognize the virtues of research
science: the importance of understanding phenomena, the need to do
proper toxicology studies and even the need to understand underlying
mechanisms by which a substance works. This is as it should be for
research. However, when one enters the risk assessment and risk
management arenas, additional virtues are appropriate.
Risk assessors should acquire some of the virtues of public health
officials (for that is in part what they are). A public health official also
has scientific training but may have to act on the best available
information without having the luxury of studying an issue until he or
she understands it with a high degree of certainty (there can be costs
from the careful evaluation of the substance in question, if people
remain exposed, and other substances are ignored). A public health
official will approach the problem of small pox much differently than
will a Louis Pasteur - one must act to protect the public, the other
seeks to understand phenomena. Both are needed for infectious diseases
and for addressing the problems posed by toxic substances, but their
roles should not be confused.
21 Carl F. Cranor, Learning from the Law for Regulatory Science, 14 L. &
Philosophy 114 (1994).
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Risk assessors should also acquire some of the virtues of engineers.
These are appropriate because engineers must frequently solve problems
even though they do not have full understanding of phenomena in
question. For example, airplane propellers kept airplanes aloft before
their aerodynamic properties were fully understood.2 2 The point?
Engineers frequently must act on the basis of clues about how a
problem should be solved and must rely upon scientific approximations
and procedures to accomplish their aims. They also may address
unknowns or uncertainties by means of approximations and safety
factors, since they cannot wait for full theoretical scientific
understanding to guide their work.2 3 Thus, the virtues of research
scientists who become risk assessors and risk managers might
appropriately be augmented by some of the virtues of both public
health officials and engineers. Risk assessors, thus, would be disposed to
use readily available scientific evidence, assess it in a timely manner, and
use appropriate scientific approximations to protect the public health. A
person with the combination of research, public health, and engineering
virtues might be in a better position to appreciate the need to minimize
the total social costs of these imperfect procedures and to implement
them.
22 Walter G. Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How they Know It: Analytical
Studies from Aeronautical Engineering 166-68 (1990).
23 Id. at 167.
